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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 We decide whether Candace Ruitenberg’s interest in 
an equitable share of marital property pending her divorce 
from Paul Ruitenberg, III is a pre-petition “claim” against 
Paul’s bankruptcy estate.  The issue has divided Bankruptcy 
Courts in our Circuit. 
 Paul filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and Thomas J. Orr was appointed as the 
Trustee of the bankruptcy estate.  Before that filing, Paul and 
Candace were in divorce proceedings in New Jersey state 
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court.  No final judgment of divorce existed when Paul filed 
his bankruptcy petition nor was there a division of marital 
assets.  Based on an estimate of her expected share of marital 
assets, Candace filed a timely proof of claim for $577,935 
(the “Claim”) against Paul’s bankruptcy estate.1  (Candace 
initially sought priority status for the Claim under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 507(a)(1)(A) and (B), but later conceded that the Claim, 
even if pre-petition, is not entitled to priority as a domestic 
support obligation.) 
 Orr sought to expunge the Claim.  He argued that 
Candace’s interest in equitably dividing the marital property 
in Paul’s bankruptcy estate was not a “claim” for purposes of 
§ 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), 
because the New Jersey court had not entered a final divorce 
decree before Paul filed for bankruptcy.  Candace’s Chapter 7 
Trustee, Barbara Edwards, opposed the motion to expunge.  
She argued that Candace had a contingent claim for equitable 
distribution of marital property, and that was a pre-petition 
claim against Paul’s estate.   
 The parties’ briefs did not detail the marital property at 
issue between Paul and Candace, nor why it mattered that the 
Claim be classified as pre- or post-petition.  In general, post-
petition claims for equitable distribution are not discharged.  
In re Ruitenberg, 469 B.R. 203, 206 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2012) 
(citations omitted).  And, as acknowledged by the parties, 
under the changes implemented by the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(“BAPCPA”), Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 215(3), 119 Stat. 23 
(2005), equitable distribution claims are nondischargeable in 
Chapter 7.  See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (excepting from 
                                              
1
 Candace later filed her own Chapter 7 petition, and 
disclosed the Claim as an asset of unknown value in her 
estate. 
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discharge any liability on a claim “to a spouse [or] former 
spouse . . . that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a 
divorce or separation or in connection with a separation 
agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of 
record”); see also Ruitenberg, 469 B.R. at 208; 4 Collier on 
Bankruptcy (16th ed. Supp. 2013) ¶ 523.23 (“Section 
523(a)(15) now provides, unqualifiedly, that a property 
settlement obligation encompassed by section 523(a)(15) is 
nondischargeable.”). 
 The record before the Bankruptcy Court and the 
parties’ statements at oral argument shed some light on the 
practical distinction between a pre- and a post- petition claim 
in this case.  Candace’s Claim was apparently premised on 
her stake in a partnership that was legally titled in Paul’s 
name and hence passed to his bankruptcy estate; it would 
likely be distributed between Paul and Candace as shared 
marital property in connection with any divorce decree.  See 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23.1 (“It shall be a rebuttable 
presumption that each party made a substantial financial or 
nonfinancial contribution to the acquisition of income and 
property [during the marriage].”).  Thus, through the Claim 
Candace sought her anticipated share of marital property that 
was in the hands of Trustee Orr in Paul’s estate.  If the Claim 
is classified as pre-petition, Candace would share in any 
distribution of the bankruptcy estate as a general unsecured 
creditor.  If, however, the Claim is deemed post-petition, 
Candace will be left to collect on her interest outside of 
bankruptcy with the fear that there will be less left after 
Paul’s Chapter 7 liquidation for that Claim than if it shared in 
his estate as a pre-petition claim.   
 Bankruptcy Judge Lyons denied Orr’s motion and 
agreed with Edwards that, under more-current decisions of 
our Court, “the pending claim for equitable distribution 
against [Paul’s] bankruptcy estate arose prepetition and must 
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be allowed.”  In re Ruitenberg, 469 B.R. at 204.  Orr timely 
appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s order, and the District Court 
certified the case for direct appeal to our Court. 
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(b).  We have jurisdiction over this direct appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A).  We review the 
Bankruptcy Court’s findings for clear error, and apply plenary 
review to its conclusions of law.  In re Handel, 570 F.3d 140, 
141 (3d Cir. 2009).  We note that Orr does not challenge any 
of the factual findings of the Bankruptcy Court.  Rather, the 
parties agree that this appeal presents a pure question of law.  
See Appellant’s Br. at 6; Appellee’s Br. at 1. 
 Deciding when an interest in the equitable distribution 
of marital assets in a divorce proceeding becomes a claim 
against the bankruptcy estate of one of the spouses begins 
with what the Bankruptcy Code defines as a “claim.”  It is in 
relevant part a “right to payment, whether or not such right is 
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, 
equitable, secured, or unsecured[.]”  11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A).  
Even if no final judgment of divorce existed for Candace and 
Paul when he entered bankruptcy, her interest was, at the 
least, unliquidated and contingent on a final decree 
apportioning marital property, perhaps unmatured, and likely 
disputed.  But, no matter, it literally is a “claim” under 
§ 101(5).
2
   
                                              
2
 A case cited by neither party—In re Skorich, 482 F.3d 21 
(1st Cir. 2007)—deserves our recognition and comment.  The 
First Circuit Court held that a pre-petition order of a New 
Hampshire Family Court transferring proceeds from the sale 
of marital property to an escrow account was not a voidable 
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 Our recent analysis of § 101(5) in JELD-WEN, Inc. v. 
Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s), 607 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2010), 
supports this view.  There we dealt with whether an asbestos-
related tort action against a home improvement retailer arose 
as a “claim” before the retailer’s bankruptcy filing.  If so, 
bankruptcy may discharge that claim even though the injury 
arose (and thus the tort action accrued) after the bankruptcy 
filing.  Id. at 117.  We noted that both Congress and the 
Supreme Court have instructed that a “claim” under the 
Bankruptcy Code be given the broadest possible definition.  
Id. at 121 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 309 (1977) and 
FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S 293, 302 
(2003)).  In the specific tort action at issue in Grossman’s, we 
held that “a ‘claim’ arises when an individual is exposed pre-
                                                                                                     
preference under § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code with respect 
to the bankruptcy estate of the husband.  See id. at 27.  In 
reaching that result, the First Circuit concluded, among other 
things, that the former wife did “not have a ‘claim’ against 
the [former husband] as a ‘creditor’,” id. at 27, an element 
needed to qualify as a preference.  The rationale for that 
statement was that the former wife’s “equitable interest in 
marital property is not a ‘claim’ under [Code] section 101(5), 
because it is neither a ‘right to payment’ (subsection (A)) nor 
a ‘right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance’ 
(subsection (B)).”  Id. at 25.  Though a forceful argument 
exists that a court granting to a spouse an equitable interest in 
the cash proceeds of the sale of marital property is a right to 
payment constituting a claim under § 101(5), Skorich dealt 
with a state court placing marital property in escrow prior to 
one spouse’s bankruptcy, and in any event the case concerned 
whether that court-ordered transfer was a voidable preference.  
Id. at 23-24.  Our case involves neither an escrow nor a 
preference claim.   
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petition to a product or other conduct giving rise to an injury, 
which underlies a ‘right to payment’ under [§ 101(5)].”  Id. at 
125.  In other words, a lawsuit based on conduct (or 
exposure) that occurred before the bankruptcy filing yields a 
pre-petition claim even though the cause of action did not 
accrue until the injury manifested sometime after the 
bankruptcy filing. 
 In Grossman’s we overruled an earlier test—known as 
the “accrual test”—set out in Avellino & Bienes v. M. 
Frenville Co. (In re Frenville), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984).  
Under that test, a claim would not exist until a right to 
payment arose (or accrued) under state law.  Grossman’s, 607 
F.3d at 119.  After weighing criticisms of the test by our sister 
circuits and commentators, we concluded that the accrual test 
interpreted § 101(5)’s definition too narrowly because “a 
‘claim’ can exist under the Code before a right to payment 
exists under state law.”  Id at 121.  Specifically, the accrual 
test “fail[ed] to give sufficient weight to the words modifying 
[the ‘right to payment’]: ‘contingent,’ ‘unmatured,’ and 
‘unliquidated.’”  Id.  Thus our holding in Grossman’s 
expanded our Court’s interpretation of the definition of a 
“claim” under § 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.  Candace’s 
interest in marital property falls well within this expanded 
definition.  
 Orr argues that Grossman’s expansion of the definition 
of a “claim” should be read narrowly to apply only to tort-
related claims and that we should continue to apply Frenville 
and the accrual test in our case.  He asserts that, per the 
accrual test, Candace has a post-petition claim because under 
New Jersey law “a spouse’s right to share in marital property 
by virtue of equitable distribution arises when ‘a judgment of 
divorce . . . is entered.’”  Carr v. Carr, 576 A.2d 872, 875 
(N.J. 1990) (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23).  Orr also 
relies on two pre-Grossman’s bankruptcy cases that held that 
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claims based on equitable distribution in New Jersey do not 
exist until a judgment of divorce is entered—In re Howell, 
311 B.R. 173 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2004) (a case decided by Judge 
Lyons), and In re Berlingeri, 246 B.R. 196 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
2000).  But contrary to Orr’s contention, both cases relied on 
Frenville’s accrual test.  See Howell, 311 B.R. at 176; 
Berlingeri, 246 B.R. at 199.  As explained by Judge Lyons, 
Ruitenberg, 469 B.R. at 206-07, and as we explain below, the 
accrual test was abandoned by Grossman’s even in this 
context.   
 Although our Court’s formulation of the test in 
Grossman’s was tailored to claims rooted in a common law 
tort action, when we overruled Frenville we spoke more 
broadly of the problems with the accrual test.  As mentioned 
above, Grossman’s points out that Congress sought to adopt 
the “broadest possible definition” of the term “claim” in 
§ 101(5), and we recognized that Frenville “impose[d] too 
narrow an interpretation of a ‘claim’ under the Bankruptcy 
Code.”  607 F.3d at 121 (emphasis in original).  Ultimately, 
we acknowledged in Grossman’s that the accrual test was not 
consistent with the language of § 101(5), which includes even 
a right to payment that is “contingent,” “unmatured,” or 
“unliquidated.”  Id.  Thus, though the test in Grossman’s does 
not directly apply to claims like Candace’s for equitable 
distribution (because there is no obvious pre-petition product 
or specific conduct at issue), the underlying rationale of the 
case and the language of § 101(5) favor a broader rejection of 
the Frenville accrual test.  
 Allowing Candace a pre-petition claim here also 
comports with a related but distinct issue we recently decided: 
whether a debtor who is pursuing equitable distribution of 
marital property in a divorce proceeding must disclose that 
interest in his or her own bankruptcy filing if a final judgment 
of divorce is not yet entered.  See In re Kane, 628 F.3d 631, 
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641 (3d Cir. 2010).  We observed that the debtor, Ms. Kane, 
“had an interest in an equitable distribution of marital 
property—namely, by virtue of being married to Mr. Kane, 
and by virtue of having initiated a divorce action in which she 
was seeking equitable distribution . . . .”  Id. (emphasis 
omitted).  Therefore, under the literal words of § 541(a)(1) of 
the Bankruptcy Code (“[p]roperty of the estate” includes “all 
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case”), “Ms. Kane’s bankruptcy estate 
included as an ‘equitable interest in property[]’ the possibility 
that the [domestic relations court] would, at some point in the 
future, award her equitable distribution of marital assets, or 
that she and Mr. Kane would arrive at a property settlement 
that transferred the legal title of marital assets to her.”  Kane, 
628 F.3d at 641 (emphases omitted).  Thus we held that Ms. 
Kane was required to disclose that interest in her bankruptcy 
filing.  Our result in the case before us, when combined with 
the result in Kane, creates a symmetry under the Code that is 
sensible: a debtor who has already begun divorce proceedings 
must disclose any expected share of his or her marital 
property as an asset of the estate under § 541, and, 
conversely, a non-debtor spouse may file a pre-petition claim 
against the estate based on his or her expected equitable share 
of the marital property even if no final judgment of divorce 
existed at the time of the bankruptcy filing. 
 In attempting to distinguish Kane, Orr places undue 
weight on the particular language we used in characterizing 
Ms. Kane as having an “interest” in the couple’s marital 
property, but not a “right” to it.  See Appellant’s Br. at 18 
(citing Kane, 628 F.3d at 642).  But, as noted, in Kane we 
analyzed an entirely distinct section of the Code—“[p]roperty 
of the estate” under § 541—that bears little similarity in 
language or structure to the definition of a “claim” under 
§ 101(5).  Kane applies to Candace’s own bankruptcy—her 
right to equitable distribution of marital assets is property of 
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her bankruptcy estate—and not to whether she has a claim to 
marital property in the custody of Orr as Paul’s bankruptcy 
Trustee. 
 We also reject Orr’s contention that allowing a pre-
petition claim in this case conflicts with New Jersey law and 
thereby disregards the rule of Butner v. United States, 440 
U.S. 48, 55 (1979).  Even though a state court in New Jersey 
may not order equitable distribution until a judgment of 
divorce has been entered, see Carr, 576 A.2d at 875, courts in 
the State recognize that certain rights to the marital property 
arise even before an order is entered.  See, e.g., id. at 878 
(“[C]ognizable rights of spouses in marital property . . . arise 
from the marital relationship in which, presumptively, both 
parties contribute in varied ways to the creation, acquisition 
and preservation of their familial property and, thereby, 
secure a protectable interest to share, possess, and enjoy that 
property.”); Vander Weert v. Vander Weert, 700 A.2d 894, 
899 (N.J. App. Ct. 1997) (“[O]nce the divorce complaint is 
filed, the marital estate is, not technically but in a practical 
sense, in custodia legis . . . [and] significant equities in the 
then-distributable marital estate are thereby created . . . .”).  
Thus allowing a pre-petition claim follows New Jersey law 
that Candace holds “a protectable interest to share” in the 
couple’s marital property.  Carr, 576 A.2d at 878.  That 
interest simply remains unliquidated and contingent until the 
domestic relations court enters a final decree of divorce and 
accompanying order for equitable distribution. 
 Finally, we note that, as a practical matter, allowing 
Candace a pre-petition claim does not raise the type of due 
process issue that concerned us in Grossman’s.  See 
Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 126 (“Th[e] issue [of inadequate 
notice] has arisen starkly in the situation presented by persons 
with asbestos injuries that are not manifested until years or 
even decades after exposure.”).  At the time Paul filed for 
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Chapter 7 bankruptcy in December 2010, both he and 
Candace were well aware that under New Jersey law Candace 
would be entitled to some share of the marital property titled 
in Paul’s name.  Hence we have even less reason here to 
withhold a pre-petition claim from Candace for any alleged 
doubt of due process.  Nor are we persuaded, as Orr contends, 
that our holding will be “unwieldy” to apply.  Filing for 
divorce is the logical time when there should exist under the 
Bankruptcy Code a “claim” based on equitable distribution of 
marital property. 
*    *    *    *    * 
 
 Although Candace did not have for her marital assets 
an equitable distribution decree in hand at the time Paul filed 
for bankruptcy, under Grossman’s “our focus should not be 
on when the claim accrues . . . but whether a claim exists.”  In 
re Rodriguez, 629 F.3d 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 
Grossman’s, 607 F.3d at 121).  Given the Bankruptcy Code’s 
expansive definition of a “claim,” we hold that a non-debtor 
spouse has an allowable pre-petition claim against the 
debtor’s bankruptcy estate for equitable distribution of marital 
property when the parties are in divorce proceedings before 
the bankruptcy petition is filed.  “[T]he contingent nature of 
the right to payment does not change the fact that the right to 
payment exists . . . and thereby constitutes a ‘claim’ for 
purposes of § 101(5).”  Rodriguez, 629 F.3d at 142.  
Accordingly, we affirm the well-reasoned decision of 
Bankruptcy Judge Lyons overruling Orr’s objection and 
allowing Candace’s Claim. 
